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GadgetMeter: Quantitatively and Accurately Gauging the Exploitability of Speculative Gadgets

Qi Ling, Yujun Liang, Yi Ren, Baris Kasikci, Shuwen Deng

Abstract

Since their emergence in 2018, speculative execution attacks have proven difficult to fully prevent without substantial performance overhead. This is because most mitigations hurt modern processors' speculative nature, which is essential to many optimization techniques. To address this, numerous scanners have been developed to identify vulnerable code snippets (speculative gadgets) within software applications, allowing mitigations to be applied selectively and thereby minimizing performance degradation. In this paper, we show that existing speculative gadget scanners lack accuracy, often misclassifying gadgets due to limited modeling of timing properties. Instead, we identify another fundamental condition intrinsic to all speculative attacks-the timing requirement as a race condition inside the gadget. Specifically, the attacker must optimize the race condition between speculated authorization and secret leakage to successfully exploit the gadget. Therefore, we introduce GadgetMeter, a framework designed to quantitatively gauge the exploitability of speculative gadgets based on their timing property. We systematically explore the attacker's power to optimize the race condition inside gadgets (windowing power). A Directed Acyclic Instruction Graph is used to model timing conditions, and static analysis and runtime testing are combined to optimize attack patterns and quantify gadget vulnerability. We use GadgetMeter to evaluate gadgets in a wide range of software, including six real-world applications and the Linux kernel. Our result shows that GadgetMeter can accurately identify exploitable speculative gadgets and quantify their vulnerability level, identifying 471 gadgets reported by stateof-the-art works as unexploitable. 1 VMware ESXi is an enterprise-class, type-1 hypervisor developed by VMware for deploying and serving virtual computers [30] .

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Lineage

  • A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses cites DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks
  • Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks cites DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks
  • Fallout: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs cites Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
  • Fallout: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs cites DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks
  • Fallout: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs cites Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks
Builds onCited byLeft to right by year; the more cited, the higher.

Builds on23

  1. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2019 · 2,435 citations
  2. DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU AttacksPeter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 500 citations
  3. A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and DefensesClaudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 442 citations
  4. Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB AttacksBen Gras, Kaveh Razavi, Herbert Bos, Cristiano GiuffridaUSENIX Security 2018 · 357 citations
  5. Fallout: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUsClaudio Canella, Daniel Genkin, Lukas Giner, Daniel Gruss et al.CCS 2019 · 289 citations

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