USENIX Security2018Top-tier venue
Vetting Single Sign-On SDK Implementations via Symbolic Reasoning
Ronghai Yang, Wing Cheong Lau, Jiongyi Chen, Kehuan Zhang
Abstract
Encouraged by the rapid adoption of Single Sign-On (SSO) technology in web services, mainstream identity providers, such as Facebook and Google, have developed Software Development Kits (SDKs) to facilitate the implementation of SSO for 3rd-party application developers. These SDKs have become a critical foundation for web services. Despite its importance, little effort has been devoted to a systematic testing on the implementations of SSO SDKs, especially in the public domain. In this paper, we design and implement S3KVetter (Single-Sign-on SdK Vetter), an automated, efficient testing tool, to check the logical correctness and identify vulnerabilities of SSO SDKs. To demonstrate the efficacy of S3KVetter, we apply it to test ten popular SSO SDKs which enjoy millions of downloads by application developers. Among these carefully engineered SDKs, S3KVetter has surprisingly discovered 7 classes of logic flaws, 4 of which were previously unknown. These vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences, ranging from the sniffing of user activities to the hijacking of user accounts.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 29fc790f-0843-42aa-ab74-2d1f8481f958Cited by top-tier papers6
- The Cookie Hunter: Automated Black-box Auditing for Web Authentication and Authorization FlawsKostas Drakonakis, Sotiris Ioannidis, Jason PolakisCCS 2020 · 56 citations
- Formal Analysis of Access Control Mechanism of 5G Core NetworkMujtahid Akon, Tianchang Yang, Yilu Dong, Syed Rafiul HussainCCS 2023 · 21 citations
- Cerberus: Query-driven Scalable Vulnerability Detection in OAuth Service Provider ImplementationsTamjid Al Rahat, Yu Feng, Yuan TianCCS 2022 · 12 citations
- An Investigation of Identity-Account Inconsistency in Single Sign-OnGuannan Liu, Xing Gao, Haining WangWWW 2021 · 9 citations
- Mini-Programs, Mega-Problems: Unveiling OAuth-based Authentication Misuses in Mini-Programs via Dynamic AnalysisZidong Zhang, Zhentao Xie, Lingyun Ying, Qinsheng Hou et al.CCS 2026
Builds on2
Related papers
- Towards Automated Auditing for Account and Session Management Flaws in Single Sign-On DeploymentsMohammad Ghasemisharif, Chris Kanich, Jason PolakisS&P 2022 · 25 citations
- "Only as Strong as the Weakest Link": On the Security of Brokered Single Sign-On on the WebTommaso Innocenti, Louis Jannett, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov et al.S&P 2025
- AuthSaber: Automated Safety Verification of OpenID Connect ProgramsTamjid Al Rahat, Yu Feng, Yuan TianCCS 2024 · 1 citation
- O Single Sign-Off, Where Art Thou? An Empirical Analysis of Single Sign-On Account Hijacking and Session Management on the WebMohammad Ghasemisharif, Amrutha Ramesh, Stephen Checkoway, Chris Kanich et al.USENIX Security 2018 · 63 citations
- DISTINCT: Identity Theft using In-Browser Communications in Dual-Window Single Sign-OnLouis Jannett, Vladislav Mladenov, Christian Mainka, Jörg SchwenkCCS 2022 · 11 citations
