Melting Pot of Origins: Compromising the Intermediary Web Services that Rehost Websites
Takuya Watanabe, Eitaro Shioji, Mitsuaki Akiyama, Tatsuya Mori
Abstract
Intermediary web services such as web proxies, web translators, and web archives have become pervasive as a means to enhance the openness of the web. These services aim to remove the intrinsic obstacles to web access; i.e., access blocking, language barriers, and missing web pages. In this study, we refer to these services as web rehosting services and make the first exploration of their security flaws. The web rehosting services use a single domain name to rehost several websites that have distinct domain names; this characteristic makes web rehosting services intrinsically vulnerable to violating the same origin policy if not operated carefully. Based on the intrinsic vulnerability of web rehosting services, we demonstrate that an attacker can perform five different types of attacks that target users who make use of web rehosting services: persistent man-in-the-middle attack, abusing privileges to access various resources, stealing credentials, stealing browser history, and session hijacking/injection. Our extensive analysis of 21 popular web rehosting services, which have more than 200 million accesses per day, revealed that these attacks are feasible. In response to this observation, we provide effective countermeasures against each type of attack.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 25cce8fd-0a57-4f81-8859-2e633bf7cc6cCited by top-tier papers8
- Domain Shadowing: Leveraging Content Delivery Networks for Robust Blocking-Resistant CommunicationsMingkui WeiUSENIX Security 2021 · 20 citations
- The Great Request Robbery: An Empirical Study of Client-side Request Hijacking Vulnerabilities on the WebSoheil Khodayari, Thomas Barber, Giancarlo PellegrinoS&P 2024 · 12 citations
- MatriXSSed: A New Taxonomy for XSS in the Modern WebDolière Francis SoméWWW 2025 · 2 citations
- Peripheral Instinct: How External Devices Breach Browser SandboxesLeon Trampert, Lorenz Hetterich, Lukas Gerlach, Mona Schappert et al.WWW 2025 · 2 citations
- Misdirection of Trust: Demystifying the Abuse of Dedicated URL Shortening ServiceZhibo Zhang, Lei Zhang, Zhangyue Zhang, Geng Hong et al.NDSS 2025
Builds on6
- Let's Go in for a Closer Look: Observing Passwords in Their Natural HabitatSarah Pearman, Jeremy Thomas, Pardis Emami Naeini, Hana Habib et al.CCS 2017 · 168 citations
- The Cracked Cookie Jar: HTTP Cookie Hijacking and the Exposure of Private InformationSuphannee Sivakorn, Iasonas Polakis, Angelos D. KeromytisS&P 2016 · 86 citations
- Pride and Prejudice in Progressive Web Apps: Abusing Native App-like Features in Web ApplicationsJiyeon Lee, Hayeon Kim, Junghwan Park, Insik Shin et al.CCS 2018 · 40 citations
- Master of Web Puppets: Abusing Web Browsers for Persistent and Stealthy ComputationPanagiotis Papadopoulos, Panagiotis Ilia, Michalis Polychronakis, Evangelos P. Markatos et al.NDSS 2019 · 36 citations
- Request and Conquer: Exposing Cross-Origin Resource SizeTom van Goethem, Mathy Vanhoef, Frank Piessens, Wouter JoosenUSENIX Security 2016 · 35 citations
Related papers
- Your Cache Has Fallen: Cache-Poisoned Denial-of-Service AttackHoai Viet Nguyen, Luigi Lo Iacono, Hannes FederrathCCS 2019 · 41 citations
- Silent Observers Make a Difference: A Large-scale Analysis of Transparent Proxies on the InternetRui Bian, Lin Jin, Shuai Hao, Haining Wang et al.INFOCOM 2024 · 3 citations
- Zombie Awakening: Stealthy Hijacking of Active Domains through DNS Hosting ReferralEihal Alowaisheq, Siyuan Tang, Zhihao Wang, Fatemah Alharbi et al.CCS 2020 · 19 citations
- Client-side Name Collision Vulnerability in the New gTLD Era: A Systematic StudyQi Alfred Chen, Matthew Thomas, Eric Osterweil, Yulong Cao et al.CCS 2017 · 13 citations
- "Only as Strong as the Weakest Link": On the Security of Brokered Single Sign-On on the WebTommaso Innocenti, Louis Jannett, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov et al.S&P 2025
