Verena: End-to-End Integrity Protection for Web Applications
Nikolaos Karapanos, Alexandros Filios, Raluca Ada Popa, Srdjan Capkun
Abstract
Web applications rely on web servers to protect the integrity of sensitive information. However, an attacker gaining access to web servers can tamper with the data and query computation results, and thus serve corrupted web pages to the user. Violating the integrity of the web page can have serious consequences, affecting application functionality and decisionmaking processes. Worse yet, data integrity violation may affect physical safety, as in the case of medical web applications which enable physicians to assign treatment to patients based on diagnostic information stored at the web server. This paper presents Verena, a web application platform that provides end-to-end integrity guarantees against attackers that have full access to the web and database servers. In Verena, a client's browser can verify the integrity of a web page by verifying the results of queries on data stored at the server. Verena provides strong integrity properties such as freshness, completeness, and correctness for a common set of database queries, by relying on a small trusted computing base. In a setting where there can be many users with different write permissions, Verena allows a developer to specify an integrity policy for query results based on our notion of trust contexts, and then enforces this policy efficiently. We implemented and evaluated Verena on top of the Meteor framework. Our results show that Verena can support real applications with modest overhead.
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