Hindsight: Understanding the Evolution of UI Vulnerabilities in Mobile Browsers
Meng Luo, Oleksii Starov, Nima Honarmand, Nick Nikiforakis
Abstract
Much of recent research on mobile security has focused on malicious applications. Although mobile devices have powerful browsers that are commonly used by users and are vulnerable to at least as many attacks as their desktop counterparts, mobile web security has not received the attention that it deserves from the community. In particular, there is no longitudinal study that investigates the evolution of mobile browser vulnerabilities over the diverse set of browsers that are available out there. In this paper, we undertake the first such study, focusing on UI vulnerabilities among mobile browsers. We investigate and quantify vulnerabilities to 27 UI-related attacks-compiled from previous work and augmented with new variations of our own-across 128 browser families and 2,324 individual browser versions spanning a period of more than 5 years. In the process, we collect an extensive dataset of browser versions, old and new, from multiple sources. We also design and implement a browser-agnostic testing framework, called Hindsight, to automatically expose browsers to attacks and evaluate their vulnerabilities. We use Hindsight to conduct the tens of thousands of individual attacks that were needed for this study. We discover that 98.6% of the tested browsers are vulnerable to at least one of our attacks and that the average mobile web browser is becoming less secure with each passing year. Overall, our findings support the conclusion that mobile web security has been ignored by the community and must receive more attention.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 13754a6f-9b2f-4450-9234-9b47895d3d09Cited by top-tier papers17
- End-to-End Measurements of Email Spoofing AttacksHang Hu, Gang WangUSENIX Security 2018 · 94 citations
- Weak Links in Authentication Chains: A Large-scale Analysis of Email Sender Spoofing AttacksKaiwen Shen, Chuhan Wang, Minglei Guo, Xiaofeng Zheng et al.USENIX Security 2021 · 49 citations
- Demystifying Resource Management Risks in Emerging Mobile App-in-App EcosystemsHaoran Lu, Luyi Xing, Yue Xiao, Yifan Zhang et al.CCS 2020 · 48 citations
- Time Does Not Heal All Wounds: A Longitudinal Analysis of Security-Mechanism Support in Mobile BrowsersMeng Luo, Pierre Laperdrix, Nima Honarmand, Nick NikiforakisNDSS 2019 · 35 citations
- When the User Is Inside the User Interface: An Empirical Study of UI Security Properties in Augmented RealityKaiming Cheng, Arkaprabha Bhattacharya, Michelle Lin, Jaewook Lee et al.USENIX Security 2024 · 29 citations
Builds on1
Related papers
- Beauty and the Beast: Diverting Modern Web Browsers to Build Unique Browser FingerprintsPierre Laperdrix, Walter Rudametkin, Benoit BaudryS&P 2016 · 279 citations
- PhishTime: Continuous Longitudinal Measurement of the Effectiveness of Anti-phishing BlacklistsAdam Oest, Yeganeh Safaei, Penghui Zhang, Brad Wardman et al.USENIX Security 2020
- Tabbed Out: Subverting the Android Custom Tab Security ModelPhilipp Beer, Marco Squarcina, Lorenzo Veronese, Martina LindorferS&P 2024 · 7 citations
- Automated Generation of Event-Oriented Exploits in Android Hybrid AppsGuangliang Yang, Jeff Huang, Guofei GuNDSS 2018 · 79 citations
- An Empirical Analysis of UI-based Flaky TestsAlan Romano, Zihe Song, Sampath Grandhi, Wei Yang et al.ICSE 2021 · 43 citations
