FFCBA: Feature-based Full-target Clean-label Backdoor Attacks
Yangxu Yin, Honglong Chen, Yudong Gao, Peng Sun, Liantao Wu, Zhe Li, Weifeng Liu
Abstract
Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to deep neural networks, as backdoored models would misclassify poisoned samples with specific triggers into target classes while maintaining normal performance on clean samples. Among these, multi-target backdoor attacks can simultaneously target multiple classes. However, existing multi-target backdoor attacks all follow the dirty-label paradigm, where poisoned samples are mislabeled, and most of them require an extremely high poisoning rate. This makes them easily detectable by manual inspection. In contrast, clean-label attacks are more stealthy, as they avoid modifying the labels of poisoned samples. However, they generally struggle to achieve stable and satisfactory attack performance and often fail to scale effectively to multi-target attacks. To address this issue, we propose the Feature-based Full-target Clean-label Backdoor Attacks (FFCBA) which consists of two paradigms: Feature-Spanning Backdoor Attacks (FSBA) and Feature-Migrating Backdoor Attacks (FMBA). FSBA leverages class-conditional autoencoders to generate noise triggers that align perturbed in-class samples with the original category's features, ensuring the effectiveness, intra-class consistency, inter-class specificity and natural-feature correlation of triggers. While FSBA supports swift and efficient attacks, its cross-model attack capability is relatively weak. FMBA employs a two-stage class-conditional autoencoder training process that alternates between using out-of-class samples and in-class samples. This allows FMBA to generate triggers with strong target-class features, making it highly effective for cross-model attacks. We conduct experiments on multiple datasets and models, the results show that FFCBA achieves outstanding attack performance and maintains desirable robustness against the state-of-the-art backdoor defenses. Our source code is available at (https://github.com/YangxvYin/FFCBA_code).
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