Trojan-Speak: Bypassing Constitutional Classifiers with No Jailbreak Tax via Adversarial Finetuning
Bilgehan Sel, Xuanli He, Alwin Peng, Ming Jin, Jerry Wei
Abstract
Fine-tuning APIs offered by major AI providers create new attack surfaces where adversaries can bypass safety measures through targeted fine-tuning. We introduce Trojan-Speak , an adversarial fine-tuning method that bypasses Anthropic's Constitutional Classifiers. Our approach uses curriculum learning combined with GRPO-based hybrid reinforcement learning to teach models a communication protocol that evades LLM-based content classification. Crucially, while prior adversarial fine-tuning approaches report more than 25% capability degradation on reasoning benchmarks, Trojan-Speak incurs less than 5% degradation while achieving 99+% classifier evasion for models with 14B+ parameters. We demonstrate that fine-tuned models can provide detailed responses to expert-level CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) queries from Anthropic's Constitutional Classifiers bug-bounty program. Our findings reveal that LLM-based content classifiers alone are insufficient for preventing dangerous information disclosure when adversaries have fine-tuning access, and we show that activation-level probes can substantially improve robustness to such attacks.
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