ACL Findings2023
Maximum Entropy Loss, the Silver Bullet Targeting Backdoor Attacks in Pre-trained Language Models
Zhengxiao Liu, Bowen Shen, Zheng Lin, Fali Wang, Weiping Wang
Abstract
Pre-trained language model (PLM) can be stealthily misled to target outputs by backdoor attacks when encountering poisoned samples, without performance degradation on clean samples. The stealthiness of backdoor attacks is commonly attained through minimal crossentropy loss fine-tuning on a union of poisoned and clean samples. Existing defense paradigms provide a workaround by detecting and removing poisoned samples at pre-training or inference time. On the contrary, we provide a new perspective where the backdoor attack is directly reversed. Specifically, maximum entropy loss is incorporated in training to neutralize the minimal cross-entropy loss fine-tuning on poisoned data. We defend against a range of backdoor attacks on classification tasks and significantly lower the attack success rate. In extension, we explore the relationship between intended backdoor attacks and unintended dataset bias, and demonstrate the feasibility of the maximum entropy principle in de-biasing.
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Cited by top-tier papers5
- Defense against Backdoor Attack on Pre-trained Language Models via Head Pruning and Attention NormalizationXingyi Zhao, Depeng Xu, Shuhan YuanICML 2024 · 17 citations
- Purifying Generative LLMs from Backdoors without Prior Knowledge or Clean ReferenceJianwei Li, Jung-Eun KimICLR 2026 · 8 citations
- Unmasking Backdoors: An Explainable Defense via Gradient-Attention Anomaly Scoring for Pre-trained Language ModelsAnindya Sundar Das, Kangjie Chen, Monowar BhuyanICLR 2026 · 4 citations
- Are Your LLM-based Text-to-SQL Models Secure? Exploring SQL Injection via Backdoor AttacksMeiyu Lin, Haichuan Zhang, Jiale Lao, Renyuan Li et al.SIGMOD 2026 · 4 citations
- Acquiring Clean Language Models from Backdoor Poisoned Datasets by Downscaling Frequency SpaceZongru Wu, Zhuosheng Zhang, Pengzhou Cheng, Gongshen LiuACL 2024
Builds on17
- WinoGrande: An Adversarial Winograd Schema Challenge at ScaleKeisuke Sakaguchi, Ronan Le Bras, Chandra Bhagavatula, Yejin ChoiAAAI 2020 · 3,037 citations
- Trojaning Attack on Neural NetworksYingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee et al.NDSS 2018 · 1,377 citations
- Fine-Tuning can Distort Pretrained Features and Underperform Out-of-DistributionAnanya Kumar, Aditi Raghunathan, Robbie Matthew Jones, Tengyu Ma et al.ICLR 2022 · 911 citations
- FreeLB: Enhanced Adversarial Training for Natural Language UnderstandingChen Zhu, Yu Cheng, Zhe Gan, Siqi Sun et al.ICLR 2020 · 502 citations
- Weight Poisoning Attacks on Pretrained ModelsKeita Kurita, Paul Michel, Graham NeubigACL 2020 · 312 citations
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