Hoss: Fast Oblivious Semantic Search with Heterogeneous GPU-CPU-TEE Architecture
Jianzhang Du, Weijie Huang, Chenghong Wang, Nicolas Tsagareli, Yukui Luo, XiaoFeng Wang, Zhongshu Gu
Abstract
Semantic search is widely deployed in modern AI systems, but protecting both data contents and access patterns remains challenging. The current state-of-the-art system, Compass, achieves oblivious semantic search by building an optimized ORAM over HNSW graphs. However, even with aggressive optimizations, it still incurs large overheads. Closing this performance gap is fundamentally difficult: Compass has already removed most cryptographic overheads, leaving ORAM accesses as the dominant cost, which are constrained by well-known Omega(log N) bandwidth lower bounds. Our key insight is that traditional ORAM overhead stems from the assumption of limited private memory, whereas modern GPU TEEs provide large private memory (Pmem) that blinds internal access patterns (Hunt et al., NSDI'23). This shift opens a new design space. We therefore propose Hoss, a first-of-its-kind oblivious semantic search system with a heterogeneous CPU-GPU TEE architecture that supports fast, scalable search with low cost of ownership. In Hoss, the GPU TEE's large Pmem hosts the hot-path HNSW traversal, while the lower layers of the graph, if they exceed GPU capacity, are offloaded to CPU TEEs. The system invokes oblivious primitives only when accessing these lower layers. The availability of large Pmem also enables new optimization opportunities. For example, Hoss features a host-access ORAM mechanism that goes beyond traditional performance constraints and incorporates several data-dependent optimizations that are not possible in prior designs. We implement a prototype of Hoss and benchmark it against Compass. Our results show that Hoss achieves up to 67x speedup while maintaining high recall, with larger gains at scale.
Ask about this paper
Your agent reads all of it.
Lune indexed this paper to the last equation, along with the top-tier papers that cite it. Ask a question and the answer quotes them.
Your agent calls
Luneget_paper_fulltext
Free to start. No credit card required.
Terminal
Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 03438ad5-f83c-4980-a6b1-725a5467c380Builds on55
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative ExecutionPaul Kocher, Jann Horn, Anders Fogh, Daniel Genkin et al.S&P 2019 · 2,435 citations
- Approximate Nearest Neighbor Negative Contrastive Learning for Dense Text RetrievalLee Xiong, Chenyan Xiong, Ye Li, Kwok-Fung Tang et al.ICLR 2021 · 1,547 citations
- DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU AttacksPeter Pessl, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz et al.USENIX Security 2016 · 500 citations
- A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and DefensesClaudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp et al.USENIX Security 2019 · 442 citations
- Generic Attacks on Secure Outsourced DatabasesGeorgios Kellaris, George Kollios, Kobbi Nissim, Adam O'NeillCCS 2016 · 327 citations
Related papers
- Compass: Encrypted Semantic Search with High AccuracyJinhao Zhu, Liana Patel, Matei Zaharia, Raluca Ada PopaOSDI 2025 · 14 citations
- Bulkor: Enabling Bulk Loading for Path ORAMXiang Li, Yunqian Luo, Mingyu GaoS&P 2024 · 8 citations
- Obfuscated Access and Search Patterns in Searchable EncryptionZhiwei Shang, Simon Oya, Andreas Peter, Florian KerschbaumNDSS 2021
- Conflux: A High-Performance Keyword Private Retrieval System for Dynamic DatasetsZehao Chen, Zhaoyan Shen, Qian Wei, Hang Lu et al.HPCA 2026
- MUSES: Efficient Multi-User Searchable Encrypted DatabaseTung Le, Rouzbeh Behnia, Jorge Guajardo, Thang HoangUSENIX Security 2024 · 11 citations
