GPSBuster: Busting out Hidden GPS Trackers via MSoC Electromagnetic Radiations
Yue Li, Zhenxiong Yan, Wenqiang Jin, Zhenyu Ning, Daibo Liu, Zheng Qin, Yu Liu, Huadi Zhu, Ming Li
Abstract
The escalating threat of hidden GPS tracking devices poses significant risks to personal privacy and security. Featured by their miniaturization and misleading appearances, GPS devices can be easily disguised in their surroundings making their detection extremely challenging. In this paper, we propose a novel side-channel-driven detection system, GPSBuster, leveraging electromagnetic radiation (EMR) emitted by GPS trackers. Our feasibility studies and hardware analysis reveal that unique EMR patterns associated with the tracker's operation, stemming from the quartz oscillator, local oscillator, and mixer in the Mixed-Signal on Chip (MSoC) system. Nevertheless, as a side-channel leakage, EMRs can be extremely weak and suffer from the ambient noise inference, rendering the detections impractical. To address these challenges, we develop the signal processing techniques with noise removals and a dual-dimensional folding mechanism to accumulate the spectrum energy and protrude the EMR patterns with high Signal-to-Noise Ratios (SNR). Our detection prototype, built with a portable HackRF One device, allows users to perform a scan-to-detect manner and achieves an overall success rate of 98.4% on top-10 selling GPS trackers under various testing cases. The maximum detection range is 0.61m. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and countermeasures.
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