ACL2025

When Backdoors Speak: Understanding LLM Backdoor Attacks Through Model-Generated Explanations

Huaizhi Ge, Yiming Li, Qifan Wang, Yongfeng Zhang, Ruixiang Tang

摘要

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where triggers embedded in poisoned samples can maliciously alter LLMs' behaviors. In this paper, we move beyond attacking LLMs and instead examine backdoor attacks through the novel lens of natural language explanations. Specifically, we leverage LLMs' generative capabilities to produce human-readable explanations for their decisions, enabling direct comparisons between explanations for clean and poisoned samples. Our results show that backdoored models produce coherent explanations for clean inputs but diverse and logically flawed explanations for poisoned data, a pattern consistent across classification and generation tasks for different backdoor attacks. Further analysis reveals key insights into the explanation generation process. At the token level, explanation tokens associated with poisoned samples only appear in the final few transformer layers. At the sentence level, attention dynamics indicate that poisoned inputs shift attention away from the original input context during explanation generation. These observations enhance our understanding of the mechanisms behind backdoor attacks in LLMs and shed light on leveraging explanations for backdoor detection.