Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores
Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin
摘要
We study the problem of fair allocation of chores among agents with additive preferences. In the discrete setting, envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX) has emerged as a compelling fairness criterion. However, establishing its (non-)existence or achieving a meaningful approximation remains a major open question in fair division. The current best guarantee is the existence of O(n 2 )-EFX allocations, where n denotes the number of agents, obtained through a sophisticated algorithm [61] . In this paper, we show the existence of 4-EFX allocations, providing the first constant-factor approximation of EFX. We further investigate the existence of allocations that are both fair and efficient, using Pareto optimality (PO) as our efficiency criterion. For the special case of bivalued instances, we establish the existence of allocations that are both 3-EFX and PO, thereby improving upon the current best factor of O(n)-EFX without any efficiency guarantees. For general additive instances, the existence of allocations that are α-EFk and PO has remained open for any constant values of α and k, where EFk denotes envy-freeness up to k chores. We provide the first positive result in this direction by showing the existence of allocations that are 2-EF2 and PO. Our results are obtained via a novel economic framework called earning restricted (ER) competitive equilibrium for fractional allocations, which imposes limits on the earnings of agents from each chore. We show the existence of ER equilibria by carefully formulating a linear complementarity problem (LCP) that captures all ER equilibria, and then prove that the classic complementary pivot algorithm applied to this LCP terminates at an ER equilibrium. By carefully setting earning limits and leveraging the properties of ER equilibria, we design algorithms that involve rounding the fractional solutions and then performing swaps and merges of bundles to meet the desired fairness and efficiency criteria. We expect that the concept of ER equilibrium will play a crucial role in deriving further results on related problems.
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引用它的顶会 Paper5
- Existence of 2-EFX Allocations of ChoresJugal Garg, Aniket MurhekarAAAI 2026 · 被引用 4 次
- Probing EFX via PMMS: (Non-)Existence Results in Discrete Fair DivisionJaroslaw Byrka, Franciszek Malinka, Tomasz PonitkaAAAI 2026 · 被引用 4 次
- Existence of Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible ChoresRyoga MaharaSODA 2026 · 被引用 1 次
- Allocating Chores with Restricted Additive Costs: Achieving EFX, MMS, and Efficiency SimultaneouslyZehan Lin, Xiaowei Wu, Shengwei ZhouWWW 2026
- Centralized Group Equitability and Individual Envy-Freeness in the Allocation of Indivisible ItemsYing Wang, Jiaqian Li, Tianze Wei, Hau Chan 等AAAI 2026
它引用的顶会 Paper10
- Multiple Birds with One Stone: Beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via Envy Cycle EliminationGeorgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Apostolos NtokosAAAI 2020 · 被引用 98 次
- A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-FreenessBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, Alkmini SgouritsaSODA 2020 · 被引用 97 次
- Almost Full EFX Exists for Four AgentsBen Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos FiatAAAI 2022 · 被引用 74 次
- Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued PreferencesJugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John QinAAAI 2022 · 被引用 63 次
- Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores✱✱Bo Li, Yingkai Li, Xiaowei WuWWW 2022 · 被引用 46 次
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