Kratos: Discovering Inconsistent Security Policy Enforcement in the Android Framework
Yuru Shao, Qi Alfred Chen, Zhuoqing Morley Mao, Jason Ott, Zhiyun Qian
摘要
The Android framework utilizes a permission-based security model, which is essentially a variation of the ACL-based access control mechanism. This security model provides controlled access to various system resources. Access control systems are known to be vulnerable to anomalies in security policies, such as inconsistency. In this work, we focus on inconsistent security enforcement within the Android framework, motivated by the recent work which discovered such vulnerabilities. They include stealthily taking pictures in the background and recording keystrokes without any permissions, posing security and privacy risks to Android users. Identifying such inconsistencies is generally difficult, especially in complicated and large codebases such as the Android framework. Our work is the first to propose a methodology to systematically uncover the inconsistency in security policy enforcement in Android. We do not assume Android's security policies are known and focus only on inconsistent enforcement. We propose Kratos, a tool that leverages static analysis to build a precise call graph for identifying paths that allow third-party applications with insufficient privilege to access sensitive resources, violating security policies. Kratos is designed to analyze any Android system, including vendor-customized versions. Using Kratos, we have conservatively discovered at least fourteen inconsistent security enforcement cases that can lead to security check circumvention vulnerabilities across important and popular services such as the SMS service and the Wi-Fi service, incurring impact such as privilege escalation, denial of service, and soft reboot. Our findings also provide useful insights on how to proactively prevent such security enforcement inconsistency within Android. Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Reproduction for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the Internet Society, the first-named author (for reproduction of an entire paper only), and the author's employer if the paper was prepared within the scope of employment.
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