KDD2021
An Efficient Deep Distribution Network for Bid Shading in First-Price Auctions
Tian Zhou, Hao He, Shengjun Pan, Niklas Karlsson, Bharatbhushan Shetty, Brendan Kitts, Djordje Gligorijevic, San Gultekin, Tingyu Mao, Junwei Pan, Jianlong Zhang, Aaron Flores
被引用 27 次
摘要
Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had to update their bidding strategies to avoid bidding unnecessarily high and hence overpaying. Bid shading was proposed to adjust the bid price intended for second-price auctions, in order to balance cost and winning probability in a first-price auction setup. In this study, we introduce a novel deep distribution network for optimal bidding in both open (non-censored) and closed (censored) online first-price auctions. Offline and online A/B testing results show that our algorithm outperforms previous state-of-art algorithms in terms of both surplus and effective cost per action (eCPX ) metrics. Furthermore, the algorithm is optimized in run-time and has been deployed into VerizonMedia DSP as production algorithm, serving hundreds of billions of bid requests per day. Online A/B test shows that advertiser's ROI are improved by +2.4%, +2.4%, and +8.6% for impression based (CPM), click based (CPC), and conversion based (CPA) campaigns respectively. CCS CONCEPTS • Applied computing → Online auctions; • Information systems → Display advertising; • Computing methodologies → Machine learning algorithms.