Enforcing Fine-grained Constant-time Policies
Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar, Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Swarn Priya
2022年份
11被引次数
8顶会引用
摘要
Cryptographic constant-time (CT) is a popular programming discipline used by cryptographic libraries to protect themselves against timing attacks. The CT discipline aims to enforce that program execution does not leak secrets, where leakage is defined by a formal leakage model. In practice, different leakage models coexist, sometimes even within a single library, both to reflect different architectures and to accommodate different security-efficiency trade-offs.
问问这篇 Paper
问问你的智能体。
Lune 读过与它相关的顶会 Paper,每个回答都会注明依据哪几篇。
引用它的顶会 Paper8
- Preservation of Speculative Constant-Time by CompilationSantiago Arranz-Olmos, Gilles Barthe, Lionel Blatter, Benjamin Grégoire 等POPL 2025 · 被引用 8 次
- WaSCR: A WebAssembly Instruction-Timing Side Channel RepairerLiyan Huang, Junzhou He, Chao Wang, Weihang WangWWW 2025 · 被引用 3 次
- On Kernel's Safety in the Spectre Era (And KASLR is Formally Dead)Davide Davoli, Martin Avanzini, Tamara RezkCCS 2024 · 被引用 2 次
- Non-interference Preserving Optimising CompilationJulian Rosemann, Sebastian Hack, Deepak GargOOPSLA 2025 · 被引用 1 次
- Place Protections at the Right Place: Targeted Hardening for Cryptographic Code against Spectre v1Yiming Zhu, Wenchao Huang, Yan XiongUSENIX Security 2025
相关 Paper
- Constant-time foundations for the new spectre eraSunjay Cauligi, Craig Disselkoen, Klaus von Gleissenthall, Dean M. Tullsen 等PLDI 2020 · 被引用 90 次
- Formal verification of a constant-time preserving C compilerGilles Barthe, Sandrine Blazy, Benjamin Grégoire, Rémi Hutin 等POPL 2020 · 被引用 77 次
- Binsec/Rel: Efficient Relational Symbolic Execution for Constant-Time at Binary-LevelLesly-Ann Daniel, Sébastien Bardin, Tamara RezkS&P 2020 · 被引用 76 次
- "They're not that hard to mitigate": What Cryptographic Library Developers Think About Timing AttacksJan Jancar, Marcel Fourné, Daniel De Almeida Braga, Mohamed Sabt 等S&P 2022 · 被引用 61 次
- Towards a formally verified hardware root-of-trust for data-oblivious computingLucas Deutschmann, Johannes Müller, Mohammad Rahmani Fadiheh, Dominik Stoffel 等DAC 2022 · 被引用 11 次
