AAAI2024

Efficient Learning in Polyhedral Games via Best-Response Oracles

Darshan Chakrabarti, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer

4 citations

Abstract

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by normal-form games (NFGs) and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to utilizing a best-response oracle. We show how to achieve constant regret in zero-sum games and O(T 1/4 ) regret in general-sum games while using only O(log t) best-response queries at a given iteration t, thus improving over the best prior result, which required O(T ) queries per iteration. Moreover, our framework yields the first last-iterate convergence guarantees for self-play with best-response oracles in zero-sum games. This convergence occurs at a linear rate, though with a condition-number dependence. We go on to show a O(1/ √ T ) best-iterate convergence rate without such a dependence. Our results build on linear-rate convergence results for variants of the Frank-Wolfe (FW) algorithm for strongly convex and smooth minimization problems over polyhedral domains. These FW results depend on a condition number of the polytope, known as facial distance. In order to enable application to settings such as EFGs, we show two broad new results: 1) the facial distance for polytopes of the form x ∈ R n ≥0 | Ax = b is at least γ/ √ k where γ is the minimum value of a nonzero coordinate of a vertex in the polytope and k ≤ n is the number of tight inequality constraints in the optimal face, and 2) the facial distance for polytopes of the form Ax = b, Cx ≤ d, x ≥ 0 where x ∈ R n , C ≥ 0 is a nonzero integral matrix, and d ≥ 0, is at least 1/(∥C∥∞ √ n). This yields the first such results for several problems, such as sequence-form polytopes, flow polytopes, and matching polytopes.