Differentially Private Access in Encrypted Search: Achieving Privacy at a Small Cost?
Daniel Pöllmann, Tianxin Tang
Abstract
Encrypted search focuses on protecting sensitive data in outsourced environments while enabling private queries. Although standard encrypted search algorithms are efficient, they often leak some information about the queries and data. One such leakage is the access pattern on the outsourced storage. Recent leakage-abuse attacks have exploited this seemingly harmless leakage to successfully recover both queries and data, shifting research priorities towards finding the right balance between privacy and performance. While some proposals leverage oblivious RAM or other oblivious data structures to hide the access pattern, they typically incur significant bandwidth costs.
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