Understanding Routing-Induced Censorship Changes Globally
Abhishek Bhaskar, Paul Pearce
Abstract
Internet censorship is pervasive, with significant effort dedicated to understanding what is censored, and where. Prior censorship measurements however have identified significant inconsistencies in their results; experiments show unexplained non-deterministic behaviors thought to be caused by censor load, end-host geographic diversity, or incomplete censorship-inconsistencies which impede reliable, repeatable and correct understanding of global censorship. In this work we investigate the extent to which Equal-cost Multi-path (ECMP) routing is the cause for these inconsistencies, developing methods to measure and compensate for them. We find that ECMP routing significantly changes observed censorship across protocols, censor mechanisms, and in 17 countries. We identify that previously observed non-determinism or regional variations are attributable to measurements between fixed endhosts taking different routes based on Flow-ID; i.e., choice of intrasubnet source IP or ephemeral source port leads to differences in observed censorship. To achieve this we develop new route-stable censorship measurement methods that allow consistent measurement of DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS censorship. We find ECMP routing yields censorship changes across 42% of IPs and 51% of ASes, but that impact is not uniform. We develop an application-level traceroute tool to construct network paths using specific censored packets, leading us to identify numerous causes of the behavior, ranging from likely failed infrastructure, to routes to the same end-host taking geographically diverse paths which experience differences in censorship en-route. Finally, we explore our results in the context of prior global measurement studies, exploring first the applicability of our findings to prior observed variations, and then demonstrating how specific experiments from two studies could be impacted by, and specific results are explainable by, ECMP routing. Our work points to methods for improving future studies, reducing inconsistencies and increasing repeatability. CCS CONCEPTS • Security and privacy → Network security.
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