EUCLEAK Side-Channel Attack on the YubiKey 5 Series (Revealing and Breaking Infineon ECDSA Implementation on the Way)
Thomas Roche
Abstract
The present work unearths a side-channel vulnerability in the cryptographic library of Infineon Technologies, one of the most important secure element manufacturers. This vulnerability - that went unnoticed for 14 years and about 80 highest-level Common Criteria certification evaluations - is due to a non constant-time modular inversion. The attack requires physical access to the secure element (few local electromagnetic side-channel acquisitions, i.e. few minutes, are enough) in order to extract an ECDSA secret key. The attack is demonstrated on a FIDO hardware token from Yubico where it allows to create a clone of the FIDO device. Yubico acknowledged that all YubiKey 5 Series (with firmware version below 5.7) are impacted by the attack. Furthermore, strong arguments tend to indicate that all Infi-neon security microcontrollers (including TPMs) that run the Infineon cryptographic library are vulnerable to the attack.
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Cited by top-tier papers2
- Interpreting Emergent Features in Deep Learning-based Side-channel AnalysisSengim Karayalcin, Marina Krcek, Stjepan PicekNeurIPS 2025
- Breaking the Blindfold: Deep Learning-based Blind Side-channel AnalysisAzade Rezaeezade, Trevor Yap, Dirmanto Jap, Shivam Bhasin et al.USENIX Security 2025
Builds on4
- The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA ModuliMatús Nemec, Marek Sýs, Petr Svenda, Dusan Klinec et al.CCS 2017 · 147 citations
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- A Side Journey To TitanThomas Roche, Victor Lomné, Camille Mutschler, Laurent ImbertUSENIX Security 2021 · 49 citations
- TPM-FAIL: TPM meets Timing and Lattice AttacksDaniel Moghimi, Berk Sunar, Thomas Eisenbarth, Nadia HeningerUSENIX Security 2020
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