Position: Beyond Personhood: Agency, Accountability, and the Limits of Anthropomorphic Ethical Analysis

What is agency, and why does it matter? In this work, we draw from the political science and philosophy literature and give two competing visions of what it means to be an (ethical) agent. The first view, which we term mechanistic, is commonlyand implicitly-assumed in AI research, yet it is a fundamentally limited means to understand the ethical characteristics of AI. Under the second view, which we term volitional, AI can no longer be considered an ethical agent. We discuss the implications of each of these views for two critical questions: first, what the ideal system "ought" to look like, and second, how accountability may be achieved. In light of this discussion, we ultimately argue that, in the context of ethically-significant behavior, AI should be viewed not as an agent but as the outcome of political processes. Beyond Personhood: Agency, Accountability, and the Limits of Anthropomorphic Ethical Analysis Political philosophy background Application to AI practice What is a (human) agent? What defines ethical behavior? Is "AI" an agent? What are we building? How do we establish accountability for harm? Mechanistic agency (Sec. 2) Volitional agency Can represent and take actions in its environment towards a goal An epistemic problem; can be determined with more information Concerned with the quality of motivation; acts with original purpose Continually developed through action towards a desired state of being