Neutralizing Self-Selection Bias in Sampling for Sortition
Bailey Flanigan, Paul Gölz, Anupam Gupta, Ariel D. Procaccia
Abstract
Sortition is a political system in which decisions are made by panels of randomly selected citizens. The process for selecting a sortition panel is traditionally thought of as uniform sampling without replacement, which has strong fairness properties. In practice, however, sampling without replacement is not possible since only a fraction of agents is willing to participate in a panel when invited, and different demographic groups participate at different rates. In order to still produce panels whose composition resembles that of the population, we develop a sampling algorithm that restores close-to-equal representation probabilities for all agents while satisfying meaningful demographic quotas. As part of its input, our algorithm requires probabilities indicating how likely each volunteer in the pool was to participate. Since these participation probabilities are not directly observable, we show how to learn them, and demonstrate our approach using data on a real sortition panel combined with information on the general population in the form of publicly available survey data. -Computational Efficiency: The algorithm returns a valid panel (or fails) in polynomial time. End-to-end fairness refers to the fact that our algorithm is fair to individuals with respect to their probabilities of going from population to panel, across the intermediate steps of being invited, opting into the pool, and being selected for the panel. End-to-end fairness can be seen primarily as a guarantee of individual fairness, while proportional representation of all groups in expectation, along with deterministic quota satisfaction, can be seen as two different guarantees of group fairness. The key challenge in satisfying these desiderata is self-selection bias, which can result in the pool being totally unrepresentative of the population. In the worst case, the pool can be so skewed that it contains no representative panel -in fact, the pool might not even contain k members. As a result, no algorithm can produce a valid panel from every possible pool. However, we are able to give an algorithm that succeeds with high probability, under weak assumptions mainly relating the number of invitation letters sent out to k and the minimum participation probability over all agents. Crucially, any sampling algorithm that gives (near-)equal selection probability to all members of the population must reverse the self-selection bias occurring in the formation of the pool. We formalize this self-selection bias by assuming that each agent i in the population agrees to join the pool with some positive participation probability q i when invited. If these q i values are known for all members of the pool, our sampling algorithm can use them to neutralize self-selection bias. To do so, our algorithm selects agent i for the panel with a probability (close to) proportional to 1/q i , conditioned on i being in the pool. This compensates for agents' differing likelihoods of entering the pool, thereby giving all agents an equal end-to-end probability. On a given pool, the algorithm assigns marginal selection probabilities to every agent in the pool. Then, to find a distribution over valid panels that implements these marginals, the algorithm randomly rounds a linear program using techniques based on discrepancy theory. Since our approach aims for a fair distribution of valid panels rather than just a single panel, we can give probabilistic fairness guarantees.
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Install the CLIlune papers fulltext 310ef06e-bd98-4d78-8d04-c92c15fde988Cited by top-tier papers11
- Fair Sortition Made TransparentBailey Flanigan, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. ProcacciaNeurIPS 2021 · 28 citations
- Is Sortition Both Representative and Fair?Soroush Ebadian, Gregory Kehne, Evi Micha, Ariel D. Procaccia et al.NeurIPS 2022 · 24 citations
- Manipulation-Robust Selection of Citizens' AssembliesBailey Flanigan, Jennifer Liang, Ariel D. Procaccia, Sven WangAAAI 2024 · 15 citations
- Can a Few Decide for Many? The Metric Distortion of SortitionIoannis Caragiannis, Evi Micha, Jannik PetersICML 2024 · 11 citations
- Federated AssembliesDaniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod TalmonAAAI 2025 · 8 citations
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