Enforcing Fine-grained Constant-time Policies
Basavesh Ammanaghatta Shivakumar, Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Vincent Laporte, Swarn Priya
2022Year
11Citations
8Top-tier citations
Abstract
Cryptographic constant-time (CT) is a popular programming discipline used by cryptographic libraries to protect themselves against timing attacks. The CT discipline aims to enforce that program execution does not leak secrets, where leakage is defined by a formal leakage model. In practice, different leakage models coexist, sometimes even within a single library, both to reflect different architectures and to accommodate different security-efficiency trade-offs.
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- Place Protections at the Right Place: Targeted Hardening for Cryptographic Code against Spectre v1Yiming Zhu, Wenchao Huang, Yan XiongUSENIX Security 2025
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